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In Wyatt, the Supreme Court again recognized the present need
for the privilege. In addition, it held that the privilege belongs not
only to the defendant-husband, but also to the witness-wife. However,
the Court compelled the wife to testify against her will under the sup-
posed Mann Act exception, basing its decision upon the legislative
intent in enacting the Mann Act. It is submitted that once the pri-
vilege is accepted, and it is considered the privilege of the witness as
well as the defendant, then in no case should the wife be compelled
to testify against her husband. If the wife does not desire to testify
it may indicate that she considers the marriage harmonious and in
need of the very protection which the privilege was designed to
provide. In addition, if it is repugnant to allow a wife to testify
voluntarily against her husband, it is even more repugnant to compel
her to do so. If it is felt that the privilege needs to be abolished in
any area, then it should be eliminated by the group primarily respon-
sible for reflecting such policy-the legislature.47
E. J. SULZBERGER, JR.
INSURANCE CONTRACTS:
METHODS OF INTERPRETATION
Three decades ago it was thought that insurance contracts should
be "interpreted by the same rules which apply to other contracts,
and ... enforced according to the intention of the parties."' Today,
although the law is still expressed by text writers in similar language, 2
recent cases indicate that the contract rule has been considerably
changed.
Nowhere is this change more clearly demonstrated than in the
New York case of Sperling v. Great Am. Indem. Co.3 In that case,
7This is the argument of Judge Hand in United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564,
568 (2d Cir. 1949) and Judge Spratley in Meade v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 775, 43
S.E.2d 858 (1947). See also Moser, Compellability of One Spouse to Testify Against
the Other in Criminal Cases, 15 Md. L. Rev. 16 (1955). An indication of what a legis-
lature might do is found in Alabama, where it was held that a wife could be com-
pelled to testify. Johnson v. State, 94 Ala. 53, 1o So. 427 (1892). Later the Alabama
legislature passed a statute which stated that she could not be compelled. Ala. Code
tit. 15, § 311 (Recomp. 1959).
22 Cooley, Briefs on Insurance 961 (2d ed. x927). Accord, Liverpool 9- London &
Globe Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 18o U.S. 132 (goi); Alterman v. Home Ins. Co., 112
Misc. 445, 183 N.Y.S. 62 (App. Div. 192o).
21 Couch, Insurance §§ 15:1, 15:9 (2d ed. 1959); 13 Appleman, Insurance
Law & Practice §§ 7381, 7385 (1943)-
17 N.Y.2d 442, 166 N.E.2d 482, 199 N.Y.S.2d 465 (ig6o).
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Christine Nystrom, a sixteen year old girl with a learner's driver
permit, stole a parked car from a public street in Mount Vernon, New
York. When pursued by police and while traveling at a speed in
excess of 9o miles per hour, she crashed into the rear of another car,
fatally injuring its occupant. In a wrongful death action instituted
against Christine, her negligence was adjudged to have been the proxi-
mate cause of the death, and the plaintiff recovered a judgment of
approximately $125,ooo. The insurer, under a "Family Automobile
Policy"4 issued to Christine's mother, refused to defend Christine,
disclaiming liability under the policy, and refused to pay any part of
the judgment entered against her. The plaintiff then proceeded against
the insurer to compel payment of the judgment to the extent of the
coverage under the policy. Summary judgment was entered against
the insurer. The New York Court of Appeals, in a four to three de-
cision, affirmed the judgment.
The pertinent policy provisions with respect to a nonowned auto-
mobile insures against liability for any injuries or damages arising
out of the use of such nonowned automobile when the automobile is
being used by the following: "(i) the named insured, (2) any relative,
but only with respect to a private passenger automobile or trailer not
regularly furnished for the use of such relative."5
In the instant case, the insurance company denied liability on
the ground that the loss was not within the coverage of the contract.
It argued that the word "furnished" implied consent and permission,
so that the phrase "not regularly furnished for the use of" could only
be interpreted to mean that coverage extended to an automobile
voluntarily supplied by the owner to such relative for occasional as
distinguished from regular use.6
The Court of Appeals refused to accept the insurer's argument.
'For a general discussion, see Elliott, The New Family Automobile Policy, 37
Neb. L. Rev. 581 (1958).
1166 N.E.2d at 484.
6In addition the insurer contended that to find it liable would be against
public policy since Christine would accordingly be the beneficiary of her own
crimes. The court "conceded that the plaintiff's rights against the insurer under
section 167 of the Insurance Law are no greater than Christine's...." 166 N.E.2d
at 484. But the court said that "the fact that Christine had previously misappro-
priated the car with which she negligently caused the death of plaintiffs husband
was wholly irrelevant in the wrongful death action, since 'injuries are accidental
or the opposite for the purpose of indemnity according to the quality of the re-
sults rather than the quality of the causes' .... The insurer here has been called
upon to indemnify Christine against the consequences of her negligence in the oper-
ation of a motor vehicle, not against the criminal consequences stemming from her
willful misappropriation of the vehicle." 166 N.E.2d at 487.
io6 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
It found that Christine was covered under the language of the policy
because literally a stolen car is one not regularly furnished. Judge
Froessel, speaking for the majority, said that "the exclusion of cover-
age for relatives driving nonowned automobiles was, by its terms, con-
cerned with regularity of use, not permissiveness of use, and was de-
signed to protect the company from being subjected 'to greatly added
risk without the payment of additional premiums'."
7
There would appear to be four possible solutions to cases with
problems similar to those in Sperling: (i) The language is unambig-
uous, and therefore the intent of the parties must be inferred from a
literal interpretation of the contractual language. (2) The language is
unambiguous, but the intent of the parties must be inferred from the
reasonable expectations and purposes of the ordinary person when mak-
ing an ordinary business contract. (3) The language is apparently am-
biguous, and therefore the contract must be construed against the in-
surer without regard to a reasonable interpretation of the contract or
the intent of the parties as shown by extrinsic evidence. (4) The lan-
guage is apparently ambiguous; and upon the finding of two reason-
able interpretations, either of which could be the intent of the parties,
the one most favorable to the insured must be accepted.
Under the first solution the intent of the parties is not a primary
consideration. Intent is inferred from the literal interpretation of the
language of the contract; and, to this extent, the contract reflects
actual intent only so far as it is embodied in the contract. This solu-
tion may lead to seemingly ridiculous results. For example, in Fidelity
& Cas. Co. v. Lott,8 the named insured, while hunting, rested his
rifle on the top of his car and fired at a deer. For some unexplained
reason the bullet tore through the curved top of the vehicle and killed
a companion sitting in the car. The pertinent automobile liability
policy contracted "to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of bodily injury... including death at any time resulting therefrom,
sustained by any person, caused by accident and arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile." 9
7166 N.E. 2d at 485. (Emphasis omitted.) The court further stated that
"'the company is bound by the plain terms of its policy rather than by what it
may have intended,' since, in construing a 'plain contract, clear and explicit in its
terms,' a court is not at liberty, because of equitable considerations, 'to obyiate
objections which might have been foreseen and guarded against' ..... We 'concern
ourselves with what the parties intended, but only to the extent that they evidenced
what they intended by what they wrote'...." Id. at 486.
8273 F.2d 5oo (5 th Cir. 196o).91d. at 502. (Emphasis added.)
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In finding the insurer liable under the policy, the court found the
words of the insurance contract to be unambiguous and said, "where
the terms of a written contract are plain and unambiguous they alone
are looked to to ascertain their meaning." The court deemed irrele-
vant the argument that the automobile was being used as a gun rest
and not as an automobile. It determined the scope of the insurance
policy by the literal interpretation of the words and ignored any
consideration of the intent of the parties outside of this interpretation.
Under the second solution the guidepost in construing the unam-
biguous language of an insurance contract is the intention of the
partiesO as ascertained by reference to the reasonable expectation and
purpose of the ordinary citizen when making an ordinary business
contract." For example, in Habaz v. Employer's Fire Ins. Co.1 2 a-flash
flood carried an automobile onto the sidewalk so as to strike the plain-
tiff's place of business in such a manner as to direct the waters against
the shop. This water pressure caused the door to break and the en-
suing damage caused by the flood water formed the basis of the suit.
The plaintiff's insurance policy covered "direct loss resulting from
actual physical contact of a... vehicle with the property covered here-
under or with the building containing the property covered here-
under....,13 Summary judgment was awarded the insurance com-
pany and on appeal the judgment was affirmed. In holding that the
words of the policy were unambiguous and that the damage was not
within the coverage of the contract, the court quoted from the opinion
of Judge Cardozo in Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,1 4 a New
York case which involved the construction and scope of an insurance
contract: "Our guide is the reasonable expectation and purpose of the
ordinary business man when making an ordinary business contract. It
is his intention, expressed or fairly to be inferred, that counts."'15
The flood in the Habaz case may be compared with the rifle in the
Lott case. The flood and the rifle were the motivating forces, the
actual cause of the damage that occurred, and the automobiles were
merely a circumstance or condition incidentally connected with the
injury.
1 29 Am. Jur. Insurance § 247 (1960).
"Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914, 915
(1930); D'Agostino Excavators, Inc. v. Globe Indem. Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 483, 184
N.Y.S.2d 378 (1st Dep't 1959); Ettlinger v. Importers' & Exporters' Ins. Co., 138
Misc. 743, 247 N.Y.S. 260 (lst Dep't 1931).
1-243 F.2d 784 (8th Cir. 1957).
"'Id. at 785.
'224 N.Y. 47, 12o N.E. 86 (1918).
1Id. at 87.
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In the Lott case the court construed the unambiguous phrase "aris-
ing out of the ownership, maintenance or use" according to its literal
meaning. The key word "use" was interpreted in its broadest sense,
and no regard was given to the reasonable expectations of the parties
The loss that occurred was not caused by a use of the automobile as
an automobile but by the independent act of firing the rifle.16 The
words used in the contract were broad general terms designed to give the
insured comprehensive coverage against liability that might be incur-
red because of the ownership, maintenance and use of the automo-
bile. 17 But the insurance policy containing this phrase should be con-
strued fairly and reasonably to effectuate the intent of the parties and
the purposes of the insured in buying the policy.'8 Obviously the in-
sured did not intend to cover liability that might be incurred through
a hunting accident. In Habaz the court modified the unambiguous
language by seeking the intent of the parties.19 It felt that this intent
was to insure against loss occasioned by normal use of a vehicle. The
court recognized that the loss did not occur because the object dam-
ming up the waters was a vehicle; the automobile was not being
used as a vehicle at that time. Thus, by comparison of the Lott
and Habaz cases the more reasonable approach to the problem ap-
pears to be the "second solution," and it results in a decision within
the contemplation of the parties which coincides with contractual
expectations.
'The words "arising out of the ownership, maintenance and use of" are of much
broader significance than "caused by." "They are ordinarily understood to mean
criginating from, having its origin in, growing out of, or flowing from, or in short,
incident to, or having connection with, the use of the car." Red Ball Motor Freight,
Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 189 F.2d 374, 378 (5 th Cir. 1951). (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Accord, Schmidt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 353 Mo. 213, 182
S.W.2d 181, 184 (1944).
"TRed Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., supra note
j3. Schmidt v. Utilities Ins. Co., supra note 16. Appleman summarizes the scope of
the coverage given by the phrase "ownership, maintenance, and use" and states rules
that have been indicated by decisions to determine whether the facts of a particular
case come within the coverage: "i. The accident must have arisen out of the in-
herent nature of the automobile, as such; 2. The accident must have arisen within
the natural territorial limits of an automobile, and the actual use, loading, or
unloading must not have been terminated; 3. The automobile must not merely
contribute to cause the condition which produces the injury, but must, itself, pro-
duce the injury." 7 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 4317 (1942). For further
discussion see Cunningham, Ownership, Maintenance and Use, 22 Ins. Counsel
J-. 494 1 1955).
aMorgan v. New York Cas. Co., 54 Ga. 620, 188 S.E. 581 (Ct. App. 1936) (con-
struing the word "use").
aAccord, Mercury Ins. Co. v. McClellan, 216 Ark. 410, 225 S.W.2d 931 (1950);
Ohio Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sparks, 57 Ga. App. 83o, 196 S.E. 915 (1938). See,
Abady v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 266 F.2d 362 (4 th Cir. 1959).
CASE COMMENTS
Under the third solution it appears that any ambiguity in the
language will be construed against the insurer without regard for a
reasonable interpretation of the contract or the intent of the parties
as shown by extrinsic evidence. For example, in Juzefski v. Western
Cas. & Sur. Co.,20 one Keys, while driving his father's car was involved
in an accident with the plaintiff. The plaintiff recovered a judgment
against Keys which was partially satisfied by the father's insurer. The
plaintiff then brought an action against the insurance company which
had issued a policy to Keys. That policy covered a car owned per-
sonally by Keys and it gave general coverage when Keys was driving
other cars not regularly furnished for his use, with this exception:
"this insuring agreement does not apply: to any other automobile
owned by... the named insured or a member of his household..-..
The trial court held for the defendant insurance company.22 The
California District Court of Appeals reversed and held that the phrase
"his household" was ambiguous. The court said the words could be
construed as referring either to a household of which Keys was a
member, or to a household of which Keys was head. The contract
was interpreted against the insurance company with the result that
the latter construction was adopted. Therefore coverage extended to
casual or occasional use by the insured of his father's car with his per-
mission even though the insured lived with his parents and hence
was a member of his father's household.
The fourth solution is a rule of construction applied by the courts
when the insurance policy will lend itself to two reasonable construc-
tions, either of which could be the intent of the parties. In such a case
the interpretation most favorable to the insured must be accepted.2s
The test in determining whether there is ambiguity is not what the
insurer intended the words to mean, but what a reasonably prudent
2173 Cal. App. 2d 118, 342 P.2d 928 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
n1 d. at 93o. (Emphasis added.)
2The trial court said that the exclusionary provisions of the policy were not
ambiguous and excluded coverage when the insured was driving any automobile
owned by a member of his household. Id. at 931.
2 3 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 7483 (1943). See Ward v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 241 F.2d 134 (5 th Cir. 1957); Associated Eng'rs, Inc. v. American
Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 352 (ND. Cal. 1959); Empire Life Ins. Co, v. Gee,
178 Ala. 492, 6o So. 9o (1912).
New York states the rule as follows: "'if a policy of insurance is written in such
language as to be doubtful or uncertain in its meaning, all ambiguity must be
resolved in favor of the policy holder and against the company' since 'the burden
... [is) on the defendant to establish that the words and expressions used not only
are susceptible' of the construction urged by it 'but that it is the only construction
that can fairly be placed thereon'." Piliero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 195 N.Y.S.2d 89, 95
(Sup. Ct. 1959).
1!)61]
110 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
person, applying for insurance of the type involved, would have
understood them to mean. 24 When an ambiguity is found in an in-
surance contract, the court might look at the surrounding circum-
stances to ascertain which of more than one possible meaning must
have been intended. 25 If the apparently ambiguous language is found
on further investigation to be susceptible of only one interpretation,
then that interpretation should be controlling.20 In such a case, it
would not be necessary or practical to construe the language against
the insurance company.
2 7
Judge Foster in his dissent in the Sperling case apparently adopted
this approach. He reasoned that " the intent of the parties, therefore,
must be found not only in the language used in the policy but also
in the normal implications that flow therefrom. I find it quite impos-
sible to believe it was the intent of the parties that the policy would
cover the operation of a stolen car.'
'28
It is quite obvious why the insurance contract did not contem-
plate coverage of a thief. The theft of an automobile entails serious
criminal sanctions if the thief is apprehended. Therefore, a thief is
willing to take greater chances while driving-especially if these
chances become necessary to avoid capture. This would substantially
increase the risk of negligent injury to third parties, and an insurance
company would not intentionally assume this risk.29 Construction
'New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rotman, 231 Iowa 1249, 3 N.W.2d 6o3 (1942).
"Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 457, 95
N.W.2d 215 (1959).
'Beard v. Peoples Indus. Life Ins. Co., 5 So. 2d 340 (La. App. 1941).
nSee Chandler v. Aetna Ins. Co., 188 So. 506 (La. App. 1939).
28 6 6 N.E.2d at 488.
2'Query, would it be against public policy to insure against the negligent
operation of a stolen car when the operator is also a thief? It is well settled that
a man cannot enter into a contract that might tend to promote an illegal act or
impede law enforcement. Fidelity 9: Deposit Co. v. Moore, 3 F.2d 652 (D. Ore. 1925);
See also Farm Bureau Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949).
"[A] construction of the policy which would extend the benefits for accidental
death to include a case where death results from the felonious stealing of an auto-
mobile .. [as] in the course of escape and pursuit ... would be contrary to public
policy...." Rousseau v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 91, 1 N.E.2d 921
(1937). In Acme Finance v. National Ins. Co., 118 Cobl. 445, 195 P.2d 728 (1948), the
owner of an automobile insured against damage by impact "while being used for
pleasure or business," joined with others in perpetrating a crime and permitted one
of his confederates to use the car as a "getway." In doing so it was wrecked beyond
repair. In an action against the insurer, it was held that the owner, in permitting his
confederates to use the car, was not using it "for business or pleasure," and con-
sequently that the loss was not covered by insurance; and that if the policy could
be otherwise construed it could be unenforceable as against public policy. See also,
Davis v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., S56 Mich. 454, 96 N.W.2d 76o, 763 (1959)
(dissenting opinion); Bowman v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 348 Mich. 531, 83
N.W.A2d 434, 441 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
